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In this paper, we investigate whether the corporate social responsibility (CSR) orientation of a 
firm affects its reporting incentives, in terms of the trade-off between real earnings management 
(REM) and accrual-based earnings management (AEM). Furthermore, relying on previous 
literature on the relationship between legal enforcement and the trade-off between AEM and 
REM, we consider whether the CSR orientation plays a moderating role in this relationship. We 
base our study on a sample of 5,863 firm-year observations for 1,141 unique firms, covering 24 
different countries over the period 2003-2009. We find that CSR-oriented firms are less likely to 
engage in REM than in AEM. Moreover, we document that in strong legal enforcement 
countries, incentives to use REM instead of AEM are significantly lower in companies with a 
high CSR orientation than in companies with a low CSR orientation. These findings are 
consistent with the expectation that CSR-oriented companies are less likely to engage in the 
more costly but harder to detect earnings management strategy, i.e. the strategy that alters the 
underlying real operations of the company (REM). We provide additional evidence for our 
arguments that CSR-oriented firms are more likely to give up REM than AEM because of its 
detrimental value on future performance. All together our evidence suggests that CSR orientation 
acts as a constraint for REM and in doing so it contributes to the creation of value for all 
stakeholders. 
	  
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, accrual earnings management, real earnings 
management, enforcement, performance 
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 This paper investigates whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) orientation plays a 
role in the choice between alternative earnings management (EM) strategies. Specifically, we 
focus on the trade-off between real earnings management (REM) and accrual earnings 
management (AEM) and we furthermore consider whether CSR orientation interacts with 
existing external factors (country legal enforcement) that shape the trade-off between AEM and 
REM. Our evidence, while supporting prior evidence that CSR-oriented firms are less likely to 
be involved in earnings management activities, also suggests that CSR-oriented firms are more 
likely to engage in AEM than in REM. Moreover, while previous literature shows that firms tend 
to substitute AEM with REM under a strict legal enforcement regime (Cohen et al., 2008; 
Durnev et al., 2011; Ipino & Parbonetti, 2011), we find that the CSR orientation of the firm 
contributes to explaining this substitution effect. In particular, the CSR orientation has a 
mitigation effect, as it counterbalances the reporting incentives stemming from the external legal 
environment.  
 Previous literature on the relationship between CSR and earnings management (Calegari 
et al., 2010; Hong & Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Litt et al., 2014; Scholtens & Kang, 
2013) generally shows that CSR-oriented firms are less likely to manage earnings through 
discretionary accruals and manipulating real operations, thereby providing evidence that ethical 
concerns are likely to drive managers to produce high-quality financial reports. Furthermore, the 
accounting literature has also documented the existence of a trade-off among earnings 
management strategies, as firms use AEM and REM as substitutes (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 
2012). Previous research has also shown that firms prefer REM to AEM when enforcement is 
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high (Cohen et al., 2008; Durnev et al., 2011; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005). This is because REM 
is more difficult to detect than AEM. Nevertheless, the shift from AEM to REM presents 
legitimate concerns because, unlike AEM, REM modifies firms’ operations, diverting them from 
their normal course without an underlying economic reason (Roychowdhury, 2006). According 
to the survey by Graham et al. (2005), executives who engage in REM are willing to burn real 
cash flows and forego projects with a positive net present value, making this earnings 
management strategy more costly than AEM.  
 We build on this literature to explore how CSR shapes reporting incentives when it 
comes to choosing between alternative EM strategies. Rather than just investigating the effect of 
CSR orientation on the level of earnings management in an international setting, we try to 
understand what forces are in place when a company has to choose among alternative earnings 
management strategies. First, we investigate if CSR orientation influences the trade-off between 
AEM and REM. We argue that because REM is more costly for the firm’s future 
competitiveness (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010), CSR-oriented firms are less likely to use REM than 
AEM, as their responsibility towards stakeholders would imply greater commitment to the firm’s 
future viability.  
 We further exploit cross-sectional variation in the level of enforcement to study if CSR 
counter-balances the incentives to engage in REM rather than AEM. The question of whether 
CSR-oriented companies substitute AEM with REM when the legal enforcement is strong does 
not have a clear direction because there are two opposing forces at play. Using AEM in the 
presence of strong enforcement might impose reputational costs associated with greater scrutiny 
that CSR-oriented firms want to avoid (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 
2012). Alternatively, firms’ responsibility towards stakeholders implies greater commitment to 
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the firms’ viability and not sacrificing the firms’ long-term competitiveness. To the extent that 
CSR-oriented firms care more about their ability to deliver value to stakeholders in the future 
(Boesso et al., 2014; Michelon et al., 2013; Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011), they might be less 
likely to engage in REM than AEM, which impairs their performance prospects (Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012).  
 We develop our arguments on the overarching idea that CSR-oriented firms engage in the 
earnings management strategy that is less costly for the long-term competitiveness of the firm 
and that, by doing so, they aim to protect the long-term interests of a wide range of stakeholders. 
To provide additional support for this argument, we conduct an analysis documenting that a 
lower use of REM with respect to AEM fosters the positive association between CSR orientation 
and future performance, thus creating increased value for shareholders and stakeholders. Taken 
together these results contribute to the ongoing debate surrounding the effect of CSR orientation 
on earnings quality that has received increasing interest in recent years (Hong & Andersen, 2011; 
Kim et al., 2012; Litt et al., 2014; Scholtens & Kang, 2013) and sheds light on a new avenue 
through which CSR delivers value to stakeholders. While previous literature has documented a 
positive impact of CSR on firms’ performance (e.g. Orlitzky et al., 2003), it has never considered 
firms’ reporting strategies as a possible determinant of this relationship1. 
 In our empirical analyses, we use an international sample of 5,863 observations from 
1,141 unique firms over the period 2003-2009, listed in 24 different countries. Since CSR 
orientation and earnings management strategies might be jointly determined, we address 
concerns over endogeneity using a two-stage least squares approach. In the first set of analyses, 
we document that firms with a CSR orientation are less likely to be involved in earnings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Even if most studies suggest a positive relation between CSR and firm’s performance, some authors have argued 
that CSR might also impose costs on firms that potentially decrease performance (Aragón-Correa, 1998; Aragon-
Correa et al., 2004; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Hart, 1995; Khanna & Damon, 1999). 
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management, and when they manipulate earnings, they are more likely to use AEM than REM. 
This result is in line with the expectation that CSR-oriented firms are more likely to engage in 
the less costly earnings management strategy for stakeholders. Second, consistent with previous 
literature, we find that firms in strong legal enforcement countries substitute AEM with REM, 
but we document that this practice is significantly less intense for CSR-oriented firms. This 
evidence suggests that the CSR orientation of the firm counter-balances the institutional 
incentives leading to the less identifiable but more costly REM strategy. Finally, we complement 
these results by showing that, as expected, substituting AEM with REM has a negative effect on 
firm’s future performance and that the fact that CSR-oriented firms engage less in REM than 
AEM partially mediates the positive association between CSR and future performance (in terms 
of future Tobin’s Q, projected up to three years ahead). Our evidence is robust to restricting the 
sample only to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, as well as to measuring REM and 
performance in different ways. 
 Our paper is closely related to, but clearly distinguishable from, extant research 
investigating the relationship between CSR and earnings management. Litt et al. (2014) find that 
firms with environmental initiatives exhibit lower earnings management proxied by absolute and 
income-increasing total discretionary accruals. Hong & Andersen (2011) and Kim et al. (2012) 
show that more socially responsible firms have higher quality accruals and less activity-based 
EM, thereby also bringing REM into the research framework. Scholtens & Kang (2013) not only 
find that firms with good CSR are less engaged with EM but also document that CSR shows 
positive interaction with investor protection. Calegari et al. (2010) show that CSR induces better 
earnings reporting quality and, therefore, has an indirect but positive effect on firm value. In 
contrast to the above-mentioned contributions, we focus on the trade-off between REM and 
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AEM and how this trade-off is affected by the firm’s CSR orientation and how it interacts with 
the level of legal enforcement. The focus on the trade-off between alternative EM strategies is 
the novelty of our paper and represents the unexplored path through which we contribute to 
extant literature on the relationship between CSR and earnings management. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
earnings management and CSR. Section 3 develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 presents 
the research design. Section 5 contains the results and robustness tests, and section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Background and prior literature 
According to Healy & Wahlen (1999, p. 368), “earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting practices.” 
Insiders can use their discretion over the financial reporting process to overstate the “true” level 
of earnings and understate any real unfavorable earnings (i.e., earnings losses or earnings 
decreases) to pursue their self-serving interests or to avoid outsiders taking actions against them. 
When there is extensive earnings management, financial reports inaccurately reflect a firm’s 
performance, and, consequently, this weakens outsiders’ ability to govern that firm (Leuz et al., 
2003).  
The accounting literature has shown that firms can either engage in AEM and/or in REM. 
AEM consists of adjusting assumptions and estimates within the accounting system and does not 
affect cash flows, while REM consists of making the firm depart from its normal operational 
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practices in order to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting 
goals have been met in the normal course of operations (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
While financial transparency and accountability are vital not just to shareholders’ 
understanding of the firm but also to all stakeholders, they are also principles that characterize a 
socially responsible firm. The CSR orientation of a firm can affect management’s discretion in 
the financial reporting process as it affects firms’ incentives on transparency (Kim et al., 2012) 
and on whether to alter the perception about the level of performance reached. Transparency is 
expected to be a tool of accountability because it enables stakeholders to confront companies and 
collectively organize against them if necessary (Dingwerth & Eichinger, 2010). As noted by 
Dingwerth & Eichinger (2010, p. 74) “transparency is expected to become a tool for holding 
powerful actors accountable” because the information disclosed by firms is expected to enable 
shareholders and other stakeholders to make informed decisions, to confront companies through 
shareholder motions or to collectively organize themselves against firms if deemed necessary. 
Similarly, according to the “myopia avoidance hypothesis” (Chih et al., 2008), CSR-oriented 
firms are less likely to manipulate earnings because they are intrinsically more committed to 
their institutional role (to create value for shareholders) and to transparent disclosure policies. 
The main argument is that CSR induces transparency and reduces the propensity towards the 
number of opportunities for earnings management. There is empirical evidence supporting this 
view and documenting a negative relationship between CSR and earnings management, with few 
exceptions.  
Chih et al. (2008) investigate the association between CSR and earnings management2, 
using a wide sample of international firms during the 1993-2002 period. They find that CSR is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 They articulate four hypotheses: myopia avoidance, predictable earnings, multiple objective, and institutional 
hypotheses. According to the “myopia avoidance” hypothesis, CSR leads to transparency and reduces the number of 
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associated with less earnings smoothing, more earnings aggressiveness (moderated by the 
institutional environment), and less avoiding of earnings losses, thus providing mixed evidence 
in support of the alternative theories. Calegari et al. (2010) rely on the work by Prior et al. 
(2008), who contend (and find) that managers use CSR to reduce the likelihood of being 
scrutinized by satisfied stakeholders. According to this view, CSR is “the result of a principle-
agent problem where the manager is an agent who utilizes CSR as a tool to maximize their own 
private benefits” (Calegari et al., 2010, p. 2). This argument recalls the Chih et al. (2008) 
“multiple objective” hypothesis, and leads to expecting a positive relationship between CSR and 
AEM. Nevertheless, Calegari et al. (2010) also argue that CSR could be part of the corporate 
culture and thus be established within a firm regardless of the agency problem. Using a sample 
of U.S. firms from 1991 to 2008, they find that CSR enhances the firm earnings reporting 
quality, in contrast with the results of Prior et al. (2008). In a related study, Litt et al. (2014) 
provide further evidence that firms with environmental initiatives exhibit lower earnings 
management proxied by absolute and income-increasing total discretionary accruals and find that 
pollution prevention and climate related initiatives help explain this inverse association. 
 Hong & Andersen (2011) and Kim et al. (2012) extend the literature on the relationship 
between CSR and earnings management by considering also REM. Both studies rely on a sample 
of U.S. firms and, using KLD data as a proxy for CSR, find that CSR is negatively related to 
both AEM and REM. Consistent with their expectations, the evidence supports the “myopia 
avoidance hypothesis” and the premise that CSR-oriented firms are less likely to engage in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
opportunities to manipulate earnings; according to the “predictable earnings” hypothesis, CSR-oriented firms may 
tend to smooth earnings to ensure that reported earnings are more predictable thus increasing earnings management; 
according to the “multiple objective” hypothesis, CSR might aggravate agency problems, giving insiders more 
impetus to conduct earnings management to mask their rent-seeking activities from outsiders; finally, according to 




aggressive earnings management through discretionary accruals and/or real activities 
manipulation, thus providing more transparent financial information than less CSR-oriented 
firms. 
In general, previous literature consistently shows that CSR-oriented firms are less likely 
to engage in earnings management. Nonetheless, besides deciding to which extent to manage 
earnings, firms also decide how to alter the reported performance. In other words, all companies 
face the dilemma about how to engage in the earnings game (AEM and/or REM) and to which 
extent each strategy should be used (Roychowdhury, 2006). We extend existing literature by 
looking at whether CSR orientation affects the trade-off between REM and AEM. We further 
acknowledge that the institutional environment shapes the reporting incentives in terms of the 
trade-off between AEM and REM (Cohen et al., 2008; Durnev et al., 2011; Ewert & 
Wagenhofer, 2005; Ipino & Parbonetti, 2011) and thus consider whether these incentives interact 
with the firm’s CSR orientation. Previous literature has shown that firms are more likely to 
engage in the least detectable, but more costly, earnings management strategy (REM) when the 
level of the scrutiny is high (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). We extend this literature by 
investigating whether the firm’s CSR orientation plays a role in shaping the firm’s attitude 
towards the less detectable, but more costly, earnings management strategy in the presence of a 
strict legal enforcement environment. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses: CSR, earnings management and legal enforcement 
Notwithstanding the various studies that analyze the relationship between CSR and 
earnings management, extant literature fails to consider that the CSR orientation of a company 
may also shape the trade-off between AEM and REM, rather than just affecting their levels. 
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While CSR is found to discourage both REM and AEM, it is not clear whether it does so to a 
different degree.  
Accounting literature (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012) documents that firms use AEM 
and REM as substitutes: when one earnings management strategy is perceived as too costly for 
the firm, executives engage in more of the other. Whether CSR-oriented firms are more or less 
likely to substitute AEM with REM is not clear. REM involves the timing and structuring of 
actual business activities in order to achieve a desired financial reporting result (Roychowdhury, 
2006). These decisions include delaying repair, advertising, and research and development 
expenses, timing the sale of equipment that will result in a gain in the quarter in which “extra” 
earnings are needed and forgoing capital projects that have a positive net present value. In a 
survey on CFOs of U.S. listed companies (Graham et al., 2005), respondents indicated that they 
are even more likely to employ REM, which affects actual business activities, than they would 
be to use AEM to achieve a desired financial result. By decreasing discretionary spending or 
delaying new projects, the effect of REM would be to impair the ability of the firm to compete in 
the future, negatively impacting on future performance because of suboptimal investment 
decision (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Thus, one could argue that for any given 
“optimal” level of overall earnings management, CSR-oriented firms are less likely to engage in 
REM, as their responsibility towards stakeholders would imply greater commitment to the firm’s 
viability and competitiveness and the non-sacrifice of the firm’s long-term performance (Porter 
& Kramer, 2006). We also acknowledge that AEM may impose risks and costs linked to 
regulatory and auditing scrutiny (Cohen et al., 2008) and might undermine the firm’s credibility 
and reputation in the market as well as among stakeholders (Badertscher, 2011; Desai et al., 
2006; Palmrose et al., 2004). Therefore, a CSR-oriented firm might want to minimize any risk 
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associated with credibility and reputation by decreasing the chances of being detected and 
therefore preferring REM to AEM. Finally, because prior literature has documented that CSR 
discourages both REM and AEM (Andersen, 2011; Hong & Kim et al., 2012), the level of REM 
and AEM could just be small overall, and therefore their trade-off naturally less significant.  
Nevertheless, we argue that CSR will discourage REM and AEM to a different degree, 
and because REM is more costly for the firm’s future performance, and because literature 
documents a positive relationship between CSR and performance (e.g. Flammer, 2015; Orlitzky 
et al., 2003), we expect that CSR-oriented firms are less likely to manipulate earnings using 
REM compared to AEM. Such an idea is aligned with the findings of previous literature, in the 
sense that, assuming that some form of earnings management will occur, CSR-oriented 
companies might be using AEM rather than REM because AEM does not undermine the 
fundamentals of the firm’s long-term value (Graham et al., 2005). Along these lines, using a 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) setting, Cohen & Zarowin (2010) show that REM has a much 
higher negative impact on future performance than AEM. As a consequence, we expect that 
CSR-oriented firms are less likely to engage in REM since this would imply cutting discretionary 
expenses thus undermining future competitiveness and corporate long-term viability. Therefore, 
we posit the following directional hypothesis: 
 
H1: CSR-oriented firms are less likely to engage in REM than in AEM 
 
Existing accounting research recognizes that the level of enforcement shapes reporting 
incentives, generates trade-offs in firm reporting strategies, and relates strongly to the decision to 
be involved in AEM (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Leuz, 2010; Leuz et al., 2003). Specifically, 
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previous research shows a shift from AEM to REM when enforcement is stricter. Ewert & 
Wagenhofer (2005) analytically demonstrate that managers react to the constraints on AEM with 
more involvement in REM, and the studies from Cohen et al. (2008) and Durnev et al. (2011) 
provide evidence that firms substitute AEM with REM when the former becomes too costly due 
to high scrutiny. The use of REM instead of AEM in strong legal enforcement countries posits 
severe concerns because REM involves the timing and structuring of actual business activities. 
Cohen & Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) show that REM has negative effects on future 
performance, and the survey by Graham et al. (2005) documents that executives engaging in 
REM are aware of burning real cash flows.  
Although Chih et al. (2008), Prior et al. (2008), and Scholtens & Kang (2013) find that the 
country institutional environment plays a role in shaping the relationship between CSR and 
AEM, the existing literature on CSR and earnings management has not paid sufficient attention 
to how CSR and the interplay between CSR and the level of enforcement jointly affect AEM and 
REM strategies. This is because most literature on the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management neglects the existence of alternative methods that make firms opaque, and because 
REM has scarcely been studied. For example, Calegari et al. (2010), Chih et al. (2008), Prior et 
al. (2008), and Scholtens & Kang (2013) focus only on AEM. When REM is considered, the 
investigation of this relationship is not properly dealt with. Hong & Andersen (2011) study the 
relationship between CSR and REM only through univariate analyses, since they consider only 
the correlation between REM measures and CSR. Kim et al. (2012) study the relationship 
between CSR and both REM and AEM using a regression model, but they do not address 
explicitly the fact that REM and AEM are strictly related to each other, being part of the same 
reporting decision of a firm. Moreover, these studies do not consider the role of the institutional 
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environment as a determinant of the choice between AEM and REM and whether this interacts 
with the CSR orientation of a firm because they restrict their analysis to a one-country sample 
(mainly the U.S.).  
A strong level of enforcement tends to encourage REM rather than AEM because the risk of 
being detected in engaging in AEM is high (Cohen et al., 2008; Durnev et al., 2011). We argue 
that the degree to which the strength of the legal enforcement discourages AEM in favour of 
REM interacts with the level of CSR orientation, because not only does the CSR orientation 
reduce the level of earnings management practices (Calegari et al., 2010; Chih et al., 2008; Hong 
& Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Prior et al., 2008; Scholtens & Kang, 2013) but we also 
expect it to influence AEM vs. REM differently. Indeed, literature shows that in a strong legal 
enforcement environment there might be relatively higher reputational costs associated with the 
use of AEM, but the use of REM would imply sacrificing the firm’s long-term competitiveness. 
If the CSR orientation drives the firm against compromising the long-term interests of a wide 
range of stakeholders (Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011), we would expect it to counterbalance the 
incentives to use more REM stemming from the high enforcement environment. This argument 
is consistent with the prediction of both instrumental theories of CSR (e.g. Friedman, 1970), 
according to which CSR is accepted if, and only if, it is consistent with wealth creation 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) as well as ethical theories of CSR (e.g. Carroll, 1979; Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995), according to which a CSR-oriented firm gives attention to the 
legitimate interests of all stakeholders in reference to some guiding moral principle. Therefore, 




H2: CSR orientation moderates the relationship between the level of legal enforcement and the 
trade-off between AEM and REM 
 
4. Research design and methodology 
4.1 Sample and data 
We compute our CSR measure from the EIRIS database and we retrieve financial data for 
earnings management measures from Compustat. We obtained 6,601 firm-year observations over 
the period 2003-2009 which are simultaneously covered by both datasets and have the necessary 
data for computing CSR, AEM, and REM metrics. Following previous literature on earnings 
management, we do not consider financial firms in our analysis. We lose 738 firm-year 
observations with missing data on Compustat for computing the control variables and therefore 
we end up with a final sample of 5,863 firm-year observations for 1,141 unique firms, covering 
24 different countries. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of observations over the time period 
(Panel A), by country and year (Panel B) and by industry (Panel C). As it is possible to notice 
from Table 1, Panel B, observations are not uniformly distributed across countries since most of 
them are concentrated in the U.S. and Japan. In the robustness test section we discuss this point 
in more detail and provide additional tests. 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
4.2 Variables measurement 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
CSR data are obtained from EIRIS. EIRIS specializes in the measurement of corporate 
social responsibility against a consistent and objective set of criteria, principally for investors’ 
use, and their data have been widely used in management and accounting research (e.g. Brammer 
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et al., 2006; Cox et al., 2004, 2007). The coverage is based on the FTSE All World Developed 
Index. 
On the basis of the theoretical contribution of Carroll (1979) and empirical work carried 
out by Johnson & Greening (1999) and Cox et al. (2004) on the multidimensional nature of CSR, 
we make use of an aggregate CSR measure that takes into consideration a range of important 
issues across companies and three constituent constructs that reflect specific dimensions of the 
overall CSR measure (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004). These three constituents (CSR attributes) are: 
community, employee, and environment. The EIRIS indicator for community responsibility is 
measured using a single variable (commitment to community or charitable work). The EIRIS 
employee responsibility indicator compasses six aspects: health and safety systems, training and 
development systems, systems for good employee relations, practices for job creation and 
security, equal opportunities policies, and equal opportunities systems. The EIRIS environmental 
responsibility indicator comprises four elements: environmental impact improvements, 
environmental management systems, environmental policy, and commitment and environmental 
reporting.  
Relying on the method adopted by Brammer et al. (2006) and Cox et al. (2007), who base 
their work on Graves & Waddock (1994), we transform the EIRIS text-grade rating for each 
measure into a number-grade rating starting at 1 and increasing with better performance. The 
community measure has four text-grade ratings, each employee aspect has three text-grade 
ratings, and each environment element has five text-grade ratings, all of which were transformed 
into integer scales beginning with 1 and ending in 4, 3, and 5 respectively. To arrive at a single 
measure for community employees and environment CSR attributes, we sum the number-grade 
ratings for each attribute. Therefore, we first obtain a community score out of 4, an employee 
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score out of 18, and environment score out of 20. We then normalize the employee and 
environment scores to a scale out of 4, to ensure that the three CSR attributes have the same 
weight in the overall CSR measure, which takes value between 3 (poor CSR performance) and 
12 (high CSR performance). 
In order to evaluate the internal consistency of the metric, we calculate the Cronbach’s 
Alpha, which is used to assess how well a list of items measures a single latent construct. Its 
value ranges between 0 and 1, with values above 0.7 commonly thought to provide a sufficient 
level of reliability. The Cronbach’s Alpha of the employee measure is 0.82 and of the 
environment measure is 0.91, both higher than the threshold. Appendix 1 provides further 
insights on the ratings procedure and an example. 
 
Trade-off between Accrual and Real Earnings Management3 
We measure AEM using the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones, 1991), as 
described in Dechow et al. (1995). We consider a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals 
(DA), where, for each year and country, we estimate the model for every industry classified by 
its two-digit SIC code. By doing so, we partially control for industry changes in economic 
conditions that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficient to vary across time (Cohen et 
al., 2008; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). 
We measure REM following Cohen et al. (2008) and Roychowdhury (2006). We use an 
aggregate measure that combines different variables of REM. Specifically, REAL is the sum of 
abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses (multiplied by minus 1). The 
higher the value, the more likely the firm is to be engaged in REM activities. Since we analyze 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Appendix 2 reports the formula used for calculating our AEM and REM measures. We use all of the observations 
available on Compustat Global to measure both AEM and REM. We require at least 10 observations in each 2-digit 
SIC grouping per year and country and that each firm-year observation has the data necessary to calculate the EM 
metrics we employ in this study. 
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firms’ trade-off decisions between AEM and REM, we create a metric that directly analyzes the 
trade-off among these two earnings management strategies. Specifically, using the final sample 
we sort the two earnings management proxies defined above (DA, REAL) into deciles (Decile 
DA, Decile REAL) and create the following two metrics: 
 𝐸𝑀_𝐴𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒  𝐷𝐴 + 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿 
𝑅𝐸𝑀_𝑣𝑠_𝐴𝐸𝑀 = 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿  (𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒  𝐷𝐴 + 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒  𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿) 
 
EM_ALL measures the overall firm’s earnings management activity, either AEM or 
REM, while REM_vs_AEM measures the use of REM with respect to the overall earnings 
management activity. Therefore the higher the value of REM_vs_AEM, the greater the use of 
REM with respect to AEM. 
 
Level of enforcement 
We measure the strength of a country’s legal enforcement using the “Rule of Law” 
variable (Daske et al., 2008; Kaufmann et al., 2009). We transform this measure into a binary 
variable (ENFORCEMENT), split on the median of the sample by year, which takes the value of 
1 (0) for countries with a strong (weak) legal enforcement. 
 
Controls 
We include in our analyses several controls that are expected to jointly affect the 
incentives and the constraints involved in earnings management and affect the choice between 
AEM and REM. Given that larger firms are more likely to avoid negative earnings news and thus 
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use earnings management to achieve this objective, we control for the firm size (SIZE) using the 
log of the firm total sales. Financial leverage (LEV), which is the end-of-year total liabilities 
divided by the end-of-year book value of equity, takes into account debt-contracting motivations 
for earnings management (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). Significant incentives to EM are linked 
with the level of profitability shown by industry peers. Thus, we include the adjusted profitability 
(ADJ_ROA) calculated as the difference between the firm’s profitability (ROA computed as 
operating income over the mean value of total assets between year t and year t-1) and the 
industry median for a given year. We control for the growth prospects using the percentage 
change in sales (GROWTH) and with the market to book value (MTB). A manager of a high-
growth firm has at the same time greater incentives to beat earnings targets because the 
asymmetry in the price reaction to positive versus negative earnings news is higher for low-
growth firms (Skinner & Sloan, 2002) and also because it is more difficult to detect earnings 
management practices, making these practices less risky (Barth et al., 2008).  
Peasnell et al. (2005) suggest controlling for the quality of pre-managed earnings, arguing 
that if pre-managed earnings are not satisfactory, the incentive to use AEM is higher. We define 
a dummy variable (BELOW) equal to 1 when the pre-managed earnings (measured by the 
operating cash flow) are less than zero (and therefore the incentives to use AEM are higher) and 
0 otherwise. We also consider the impact of the outperforming good firms. Following Peasnell et 
al. (2005) we identify an outperforming good firm when its pre-managed earnings, measured as 
the operating cash flow, are in the fourth quartile of the distribution of pre-managed earnings of 
industry peers conditioned to positive pre-managed earnings. We define the dummy variable 
(HIGH) equal to 1 when the firm is outperforming (operating cash flow in the fourth quartile) 
and 0 otherwise.  
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Following the literature on IFRS adoption (Houqe et al., 2012; Marra et al., 2011), we 
also control for whether firms prepare the reports using IFRS (IFRS), by including a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firms adopt the IFRS and 0 if reports are prepared using domestic GAAP. 
Incentives to show better earnings also derive from the importance of the capital market in the 
economy of the country: as a control we use the logarithm of stock market capitalization 
(MKT_CAP). Consistent with previous studies on AEM, we also control for litigation risk 
(LITIGATION), measured as a dummy variable that indicates membership in a high-risk industry 
(SICs 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961). Barton & Simko (2002) 
identify the lagged net operating assets scaled by lagged sales (NOA) as a limit of the flexibility 
for AEM. The higher the NOA is, the lower the manager’s ability to inflate earnings upward 
through accruals.  
We also control for macro-economic factors using the log transformed average gross 
domestic product per capita (GDP), taken from the World Bank, over the period 1990-2000. This 
variable, which captures the extent to which a country is developed or developing, is widely used 
in international accounting research (Haw et al., 2004) to deal with the effect of unobserved 
country-specific factors that may be associated with EM practices.  
Given that CSR orientation is industry sensitive, we employ a dummy variable (ESSI) 
that identifies socially and environmentally sensitive industries. Following Brammer & 
Millington (2005), we classify firms from the extractive (mining and petroleum), chemical, 
paper, pharmaceutical, alcoholic beverages, and defence industries as facing greater social 
exposures.  Based on prior studies focusing only on environmental disclosure (e.g. Cho & Patten, 
2007; Freedman et al., 2004; Freedman & Wasley, 1990), we classify companies from the 
chemical, mining, metals, paper, petroleum, and utility industries as environmentally sensitive. 
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Finally, we include indicator variables to control for year and country fixed effects. Appendix 3 
reports the description of all variables employed in this study 
4.3 Research models 
CSR and the Trade-off between Accrual and Real Earnings Management 
In order to test our first hypothesis on whether the firm’s CSR orientation affects the 
trade-off between REM and AEM, we model the reporting strategies as a function of CSR 
orientation. In these analyses, we acknowledge that OLS estimation might suffer from 
endogeneity: firms might determine reporting strategies and CSR orientation jointly, and some 
unobservable factors might affect both the trade-off between AEM vs. REM and CSR. This 
endogenous relationship might induce OLS estimators to be biased4. In order to address this 
concern about endogeneity, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. Specifically, as 
an instrument for CSR orientation of firm i in year t, we use the mean of the CSR orientation in 
year t of all firms belonging to firm i's 2-digits SIC code, excluding firm i (CSR_IV). The 
underlying motivation for using this instrument is that CSR orientation tends to be correlated in 
given industries (Fabrizi et al., 2014; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997), but 
arguably the industry CSR orientation is not related to the EM policies of a single firm5.  
We test if CSR orientation is negatively associated to the firms’ overall earnings 
management activity (either AEM or REM) by estimating the following 2SLS regression, with 
robust standard errors clustered at firm level, with year and country fixed effects: 
 
EM_ALL = α0+ α1CSR+ α2SIZE+ α3LEV+ α4ADJ_ROA+ α5GROWTH+ α6MTB+ α7BELOW+ 
α8HIGH+ α9IFRS+ α10MKT_CAP+ α11LITIGATION+ α12NOA+  
α13GDP+ α14ESSI+ ε                                                                      (1) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4We also run a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test that indicates that CSP is indeed endogenous (p-value < 0.00) and thereby 
estimates obtained by OLS models are not consistent.	  





where all variables have already been defined. In line with previous literature (i.e. Hong & 
Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012) we expect a negative and significant coefficient on α1. To test 
H1, we estimate model (1) using as the dependent variable our trade-off metric and we base our 
conclusions about H1 on the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient α1: 
 
 
REM_vs_AEM = α0+ α1CSR+ α2SIZE+ α3LEV+ α4ADJ_ROA+ α5GROWTH+ α6MTB+ 
α7BELOW+ α8HIGH+ α9IFRS+ α10MKT_CAP+ α11LITIGATION+ 
α12NOA+  α13GDP+ α14ESSI+ ε                             (2) 
 
 
CSR, Legal Enforcement, and the Trade-off between Accrual and Real Earnings Management 
In order to test our second research hypothesis on whether the firm’s CSR orientation 
interacts with the legal enforcement in driving the choice between AEM and REM, we interact 
the variable ENFORCEMENT with CSR. We base our conclusions about H2 on the sign and 
statistical significance of the interaction coefficient α3 in the following model: 
 
 
REM_vs_AEM = α0+ α1CSR+ α2ENFORCEMENT + α3ENFORCEMENT * CSR + α4SIZE+ 
α5LEV+ α6ADJ_ROA+ α7GROWTH+ α8MTB+ α9BELOW+ α10HIGH+ 
α11IFRS+ α12MKT_CAP+ α13LITIGATION+ α14NOA+ α15GDP+ α16ESSI+ ε            
(3)                                                     
 
5. Empirical analyses 
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5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis, while 
Table 3 shows correlation coefficients among the variables. Earnings management values are 
comparable with those of previous studies and thus assure the comparability of our work with 
previous research. Table 2 Panel A indicates that our final sample is mainly composed of large 
and profitable firms with relatively high growth opportunities. This caveat should be considered 
when interpreting the results. Table 2 Panel B shows the mean and median of the main variables 
of interest by country.  
 
<< Insert Table 2 and 3 about here >> 
 
5.2 Multivariate analyses 
Table 4 reports results for model (1) estimated through 2SLS. Column 1 reports estimates 
for the first-stage equation, documenting (as expected) a strong association between firm and 
industry CSR levels.  Second-stage results for the full sample are shown in column 2 while 
column 3 restricts the sample to only non-U.S. firms. The negative and significant coefficients of 
CSR indicate that firms with high levels of CSR orientation engage less in earnings management 
(either AEM or REM).  
There are two main differences between our empirical models and those used by Kim et al. 
(2012). First, we use the decile distribution of accrual and real earnings management proxies 
instead of their raw values (DA and REAL), and second, we use an instrumental variable 
approach. To make sure that results documented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 are not driven by 
specific research design choices, we also estimate model (1) without the instrumental variable 
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approach and using separately the raw values of the earnings management proxies instead of 
their decile distribution.  Results are reported in columns 4 and 5, and corroborate those 
previously discussed. 
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
To start investigating H1, we analyze whether CSR orientation discourages REM and 
AEM to a different degree. Because of scale problems, we cannot directly compare the 
coefficients on CSR in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4. Therefore, in columns 6 and 7 we replicate 
the model estimated in columns 4 and 5, respectively, but tabulate standardized beta coefficients. 
As it is possible to notice, the beta coefficient on CSR in column 7 is much larger than the 
coefficient in column 6, thus documenting that the negative impact of CSR on real earnings 
management is stronger than the impact on accrual-based earnings management. The two 
coefficients are statistically different at the 1% level and show that, on average, CSR constrains 
REM more than AEM (Chi2: 83.83, p < 0.0001). The last column of Table 4 reports 2SLS 
estimates of model (2). The negative and significant coefficient on CSR supports our hypothesis 
and documents that firms with a CSR orientation are more likely to use AEM than REM, in line 
with the expectation that CSR-oriented firms are more likely to engage in the less costly earnings 
management strategy for stakeholders, i.e., AEM, since it does not alter the underlying real 
operations of the company. 
 Evidence for our second hypothesis is shown in Table 5 in which we report 2SLS 
estimates from model (3) and exploit the cross-sectional variation in our international sample. 
The main effect of enforcement is indicated by the positive coefficient of the variable 
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ENFORCEMENT. Consistent with previous literature, we find that firms in a strong legal 
enforcement environment tend to use more REM than AEM. The negative coefficient on the 
interaction term between ENFORCEMENT and CSR supports H2 and indicates that the CSR 
orientation of firms interacts with the level of legal enforcement as a constraint to substitute 
AEM with REM. We show that the incentive to use REM instead of AEM due to the legal 
enforcement is significantly lower for firms with high CSR orientation. This result is aligned 
with theoretical arguments supporting a positive association between CSR and firm performance 
(among others: Carroll, 1979; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995): in a strong legal 
enforcement environment the use of REM versus AEM is less prominent for CSR-oriented firms, 
because the CSR orientation counter-balances the incentives stemming from the institutional 
environment to use the less identifiable, but more costly, REM strategy.  
 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
 
5.3 Additional analyses: CSR, EM strategies and the effect on future performance 
In building our hypotheses, we argued that firms are more likely to use AEM than REM 
because CSR-oriented firms will engage in the earnings management strategy that is less costly 
for the long-term competitiveness of the firm and, by doing so, protect the long-term interests of 
a wide range of stakeholders. If this argument holds true, we expect CSR-oriented firms to be 
associated with better future performance and their reporting strategies to be drivers of future 
performance as they are less involved in REM. AEM is mainly carried out by adjusting 
assumptions and estimates within the accounting system, and thus it is not associated with any 
real impact on corporate operations and does not affect the current cash flow. However REM 
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consists of making the firm depart from its normal operational practices (Roychowdhury, 2006) 
and it impairs the firm’s performance prospects. Thus, the costs associated with engaging in 
REM mainly materialize in harm to future performance because of the involvement in sub-
optimal investment allocation decisions. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) empirically show (in a SEO context) that the negative effect 
of REM on subsequent performance is greater than the effect of AEM. To the extent that CSR 
has a positive impact on firms’ future performance (Flammer, 2015; Orlitzky et al., 2003), and 
we find that CSR-oriented firms engage less in REM than AEM, we expect earnings 
management strategies to have not only a direct effect on future performance but also a 
mediating role between CSR orientation and future performance. Evidence of such a mediating 
role would improve the understanding and interpretation of, as well as further support for, our 
main evidence. Therefore, in this section we investigate whether (a) CSR orientation is positively 
associated with future performance, and (b) the trade-off between REM than AEM, driven by the 
CSR orientation of a firm, additionally mediates the positive association documented in the 
literature between CSR and future performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Flammer, 2015; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003).  
We use the Sobel-Goodman test that analyzes whether a mediator carries the influence of 
an independent variable to a dependent variable. This test is useful because we can test 
simultaneously (a) and (b) and also consider other potential links between the variables of 
interest: CSR orientation, trade-off between REM and AEM, and future performance. Figure 1 
shows our test setting. Mediation can be said to occur when (i) the independent variable (CSR) 
significantly affects the mediator (REM_vs_AEM) as per link A in Figure 1; (ii) the independent 
variable significantly affects the dependent one (future performance) in the absence of the 
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mediator, as per link C in Figure 1; (iii) the mediator has a significant unique effect on the 
dependent variable, as per link B in Figure 1; and (iv) the effect of the independent variable on 
the dependent variable significantly shrinks upon the addition of the mediator to the model, as 
per link CI in Figure 1.  
 
<< Insert Figure 1 about here >> 
Specifically, the Sobel-Goodman test performs a set of OLS regressions to estimate 𝛾, 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾!, as shown in Figure 1. 𝛾 is the coefficient on CSR obtained regressing CSR (and 
control variables) on Tobin’s Q; 𝛼 is the coefficient on CSR obtained regressing CSR (and 
control variables) on REM_vs_AEM; 𝛽 is the coefficient on REM_vs_AEM obtained regressing 
REM_vs_AEM (and control variables) on future performance; and 𝛾! is the coefficient on CSR 
obtained regressing CSR and REM_vs_AEM (plus control variables) on future performance. The 
Sobel-Goodman test performs a Z-test to evaluate if 𝛾! is significantly different from 𝛾. If so, it 
is possible to conclude that the variable REM_vs_AEM partially mediates the relation between 
CSR and future performance. When REM_vs_AEM is the dependent variable, we use the same 
set of controls as in model (1). In contrast, when future performance is the dependent variable, 
we control for SIZE, LEV, ADJ_ROA, GROWTH, MTB, HIGH, GDP, and ESSI. All variables 
are computed as previously described. Using the same set of controls when both REM_vs_AEM 
and future performance are the dependent variables does not change our results.  
We measure future performance using the Tobin’s Q computed one, two, and three years 
ahead as (total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) scaled by total assets. The 
Tobin’s Q is a metric of shareholder value widely used in the accounting, finance, and 
management literature (e.g. Daske et al., 2008; Doidge et al., 2004; Fabrizi, 2014; Lang & Stulz, 
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1993; Rao et al., 2004; Servaes, 1991; Simon & Sullivan, 1993; Youndt et al., 2004). Higher 
values of Tobin’s Q reflect differences in expected discount rates and/or differences in expected 
future cash flows or growth expectations.  
Figure 2 reports the results from the Sobel-Goodman test to verify whether the fact that 
CSR affects the trade-off between REM and AEM partially mediates the positive association 
between CSR and future performance, measured as Tobin’s Q one year ahead. Table 6 reports 
full results from the regression models used to perform the Sobel-Goodman test. Results 
consistently show that (i) CSR orientation has a positive and strong effect on future performance 
(thus confirming our ex-ante expectation that CSR orientation has a positive impact on future 
performance—link C in Figure 1); (ii) CSR orientation has a negative and strong effect on the 
trade-off between REM and AEM (as already shown in Table 4—link A in Figure 1); (iii) the 
trade-off between REM and AEM has a negative and strong effect on firms’ future performance 
(thus confirming our ex-ante expectation that REM is detrimental for firms’ future performance 
to a larger extent than AEM– link B in Figure 1); and (iv) the positive effect that CSR orientation 
has on future performance shrinks upon the inclusion of the variable “REM_vs_AEM” in the 
model (link CI in Figure 1). This latter result is supported by the highly significant Z-value of the 
Sobel tests, which strongly supports the hypothesis that the positive effect that CSR has on future 
performance is partially mediated by its effect on the trade-off between REM and AEM. Un-
tabulated results show that this evidence holds well even if we compute Tobin’s Q two or three 
years ahead6. This evidence provides additional support to our main analyses about the 
relationship between REM and AEM under different levels of CSR orientation and support the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Evidence (un-tabulated) remains unchanged if we measure a firm’s operating performance using operating cash 
flow (Compustat item “oancf”) scaled by total assets (see Fabrizi, 2014).	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argument that CSR-oriented firms are less likely to engage in REM because of their greater 
consideration about future performance.  
 
<< Insert Figure 2 and Table 6 about here >> 
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
Firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
To strengthen our results, we repeat our tests using a sub-sample of firms that meet or 
beat analysts’ consensus forecasts. This approach is consistent with Brown & Caylor (2005) 
showing that, in recent years, managers seek to avoid missing earnings forecasts more than 
missing other targets The advantage of this approach is that firms that successfully meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts are more likely to have managed earnings upwards. On the other hand, having 
a much smaller sample size reduces the power of our tests. As a consequence, in the paper we 
report results using both approaches7. Table 7 reports the 2SLS estimates from model (2) using 
only those firms with earnings per share equal to, or higher than, the analysts’ median forecasts. 
Results are consistent with those reported in the main analysis (Table 5). Un-tabulated results on 
the Sobel-Goodman test are also aligned with our main analysis.  
<< Insert Table 7 about here >> 
 
Alternative measure of earnings management and future performance 
We re-run the analysis for investigating H1 and H2 by computing a second proxy for real 
earnings management (REAL2) as the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Because of our small sample size, we cannot limit the analysis to those firms that beat analysts’ forecasts by only 
0.01 cent.  
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discretionary expenses, both of them multiplied by minus 1. The use of this second proxy is 
consistent with Cohen & Zarowin (2010). High values of this variable indicate that the firm is 
engaging in sales manipulations and cutting discretionary expenditure to manage reported 
earnings upward. Similar to the main analysis, we sort both DA and REAL2 into deciles and 
create our two metrics EM_ALL2 and REM2_vs_AEM. We estimate both model (1) and model 
(2) using a 2SLS regression, with robust standard errors clustered at firm level, and year and 
country fixed effects. Table 8 reports the results respectively in column 1 and column 2. Our 
results hold well, and the estimated coefficients are also very similar to the ones obtained in the 
main analysis. 
<<Insert Table 8 about here>> 
Controlling for investor protection, governance, and foreign sales 
In un-tabulated additional analyses, we consider three further factors that might be 
affecting our results. While the simultaneous use of Kaufmann’s rule of law and country-fixed 
effects should mitigate concerns over the fact that other country-specific factors are driving our 
results, we further include in our specification a control measure of investor protection. 
Specifically, in the spirit of La Porta et al. (2006), we use disclosure requirements, liability 
standards, and an index of anti-director rights as proxies for investor protection. We reduced 
these metrics to a single variable by means of a principal component analysis. Second, it is likely 
that the corporate governance model of the firm has an impact on earnings management activities 
(Xie et al., 2003) as well as on CSR (Mallin & Michelon, 2011). Thus, we include as a control 
the governance score as reported by EIRIS. Third, it is likely that the level of international 
operations affects both the degree to which companies manage earnings as well as the CSR 
strategies they undertake. Thus we include as an additional control the percentage of foreign 
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sales as a proportion of total sales. Un-tabulated results show a positive and significant impact of 
investor protection and governance on the trade-off between REM and AEM, while we do not 
find a significant coefficient on the percentage of foreign sales. After the inclusion of these 
additional variables, the main evidence remains unchanged8.  
 
Sample composition 
Given the country and industry sample distribution reported in Table 1, many countries 
and industries have low representation. In this section, we investigate whether results are driven 
by few countries and/or industries. Specifically, we re-test H1 using OLS models excluding 
observations from or restricting observations to, respectively: the U.S., Japan, the U.S. and 
Japan, non-U.S. and non-Japan countries with number of observations greater than 100, and the 
manufacturing industry. For completeness, we performed these analyses including also the 
controls for investor protection, governance, and foreign sales. CSR is found to be significantly 
and negatively associated with REM_vs_AEM across all tests, with the only exception of the 
analysis excluding observations from the manufacturing industry, where the coefficient 
(although still negative) is not significant (p-value equal to 0.16). Overall, we conclude that, 
despite the unbalanced sample compositions, our main evidence seems not to be driven by a few 
countries. 
	  
6. Conclusion and discussion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  We lose 6 observations due to missing data on foreign sales.	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In this study, we investigate whether the CSR orientation of a company (i) is related to its 
reporting strategies in terms of the trade-off between REM and AEM, and (ii) moderates the 
relationship between the level of legal enforcement and the trade-off between AEM and REM.  
We extend previous studies on the U.S. setting (e.g. Kim et al., 2012) and find that even 
in an international setting, the CSR orientation is negatively associated with the use of earnings 
management strategies. In this regard, our research provides two insights. First, firms with a CSR 
orientation are more likely to use AEM than REM, in line with the expectation that CSR-oriented 
firms are more likely to engage in the less costly earnings management strategy for stakeholders, 
i.e., one which does not alter the underlying real operations of the company. Second, the CSR 
orientation of the firm interacts with the characteristics of the institutional environment, such as 
the legal enforcement, in shaping the reporting incentives. Whereas previous literature has 
documented a shift from the use of AEM to REM in a strong legal enforcement environment, we 
show that firms’ use of REM—which is harder to detect—instead of AEM is significantly lower 
in companies with a high CSR orientation. This finding is important because of REM’s negative 
long-term impact on the firm’s value drivers. 
 Our main results are strengthened by the association among the firm’s CSR orientation, 
the choice between REM and AEM and the firm’s future performance. Previous literature 
(Flammer, 2015; Orlitzky et al., 2003) documents a positive relationship between CSR 
orientation and performance. Our results show that the choice of earnings management strategies 
plays a role in mediating this association and that CSR orientation, acting as a constraint for 
REM, contributes to the creation of value for all stakeholders. Specifically, we find evidence that 
a lower engagement in REM vs. AEM partially mediates the positive relationship between CSR 
and future performance. The mediation analysis shows that good CSR firms engage less in REM 
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(which is value destroying) than in AEM and this partially explains why they exhibit higher 
performance. By pushing firms to engage less in REM than in AEM, the CSR orientation is able 
to drive an additional positive effect (besides the direct one) on performance, as REM is 
negatively related to performance.	  This further evidence suggests that when considering how to 
manipulate earnings, CSR-oriented firms opt for the less penalizing strategy in terms of future 
performance, thus protecting both shareholders’ interests and the interests of all the firms’ 
stakeholders. Thus, we shed new light on the mechanisms through which CSR delivers value to 
stakeholders.  Overall, our evidence suggests that CSR can create value for the shareholders and 
stakeholders by driving accounting policies and the trade-offs amongst them.  
Our study has important contributions. First, not only do we show that CSR is negatively 
associated with earnings management in an international setting, but we also provide evidence 
that CSR affects the trade-off amongst earnings management strategies, thus shedding light on 
how CSR-oriented firms manage their earnings by favoring AEM instead of REM. Second, by 
investigating the relationship between CSR and earnings management in an international setting, 
we contribute to the literature on the interplay between reporting incentives stemming from the 
institutional environment and firm level characteristics. We believe that our contribution is 
particularly relevant because REM is a more covert way of managing earnings, it has a 
potentially long-term impact on firms’ viability, and it damages the value drivers. Third, we 
contribute to the extant literature about the relationship between CSR and future performance 
(Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Flammer, 2015; Herremans et al., 1993; Orlitzky et al., 2003). We 
show that the positive impact of firms’ CSR orientation on performance is partially mediated by 
firms’ earnings management choices, since CSR orientation prevents firms from manipulating 
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real operations with negative consequences on their future performance. Thus, we shed light on a 
new avenue through which CSR delivers value to stakeholders.  
Like all studies, ours is not without its limitations. First of all, CSR is measured using a 
proxy and although we believe it to be reliable and accurate, it may not be capturing the true 
underlying attributes. Moreover, EIRIS—as with many other providers of CSR data—mixes data 
from public and corporate information and possibly this can introduce a selection bias. Thus, 
results should be interpreted with caution and further research could use different proxies for 
CSR. Second, the use of an instrumental variable approach can only mitigate concerns about 
endogeneity without providing a definitive solution since the identification of appropriate 
instruments relies on strong assumptions that might not hold. Third, the trade-off between AEM 
and REM is not observable and we measure it using a proxy that is likely to introduce noise in 
the analysis. 
Future research might expand our work by investigating in more detail the mechanisms 
through which CSR orientation induces firms to avoid the use of real earnings management. 
Indeed, it would be beneficial to understand which specific dimension of the CSR construct (e.g. 
employee, environment, etc.) has the strongest impact on firms’ reporting incentives and why. 
Overall, our results point to the pivotal importance of sharpening our understanding of the effects 
that CSR orientation has on firms’ reporting strategies and incentives, and also taking into 
consideration the potential impact in terms of future performance. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection and Distribution 
Panel A. Distribution of observations 




2003 602 10.27 10.27 
2004 619 10.56 20.86 
2005 844 14.40 35.24 
2006 894 15.25 50.50 
2007 929 15.85 66.37 
2008 956 16.31 82.66 
2009 1,019 17.38 100.00 
        
Total 5,863 100.00   
 
Panel B. Breakdown of observations by country and year 
  Year   
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
AUSTRALIA 13 16 35 34 35 38 43 214 
BELGIUM 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 19 
CHINA & HONG KONG 3 4 10 10 8 9 15 59 
DENMARK 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 29 
FINLAND 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
FRANCE 23 26 27 29 32 34 33 204 
GERMANY 21 22 23 25 25 26 25 167 
GREECE 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 7 
IRELAND 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
ISRAEL 0 0 1 2 1 1 6 11 
ITALY 4 4 5 5 7 10 9 44 
JAPAN 213 213 281 300 313 323 324 1,967 
SOUTH KOREA 0 0 0 6 0 0 47 53 
NETHERLANDS 4 4 5 5 6 8 8 40 
NEW ZEALAND 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 
NORWAY 0 0 1 3 4 4 4 16 
SINGAPORE 3 6 12 14 14 11 11 71 
SPAIN 0 2 10 10 11 11 7 51 
SWEDEN 12 12 14 12 11 11 13 85 
SWITZERLAND 17 17 19 18 19 20 20 130 
THAILAND 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
UNITED KINGDOM 54 54 63 60 61 57 55 404 
UNITED STATES 228 232 328 350 371 380 387 2,276 
Total 602 619 844 894 929 956 1,019 5,863 




Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  5  
Mining  256  
Construction  198  
Manufacturing  3,441  
Transportation and Utilities  727  
Trade  624  
Services  612  









Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A. Overall sample 
              
Variables N Mean SD 25thperc.  50thperc.  75thperc.  
       DA  5,863  0.011 0.073 -0.021 0.008 0.044 
REAL  5,863  0.007 0.287 -0.128 0.013 0.144 
CSR  5,863  6.722 2.139 5.130 6.620 8.440 
ENFORCEMENT  5,863  0.596 0.491 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE  5,863  8.892 1.076 8.099 8.820 9.739 
LEV  5,863  0.170 0.146 0.055 0.151 0.243 
ADJ_ROA  5,863  0.191 0.506 0.008 0.063 0.208 
GROWTH  5,863  0.737 5.019 -0.103 0.254 0.817 
MTB  5,863  3.417 4.992 1.461 2.376 4.053 
BELOW  5,863  0.030 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HIGH  5,863  0.706 0.456 0.000 1.000 1.000 
IFRS  5,863  0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MKT_CAP  5,863  1.230 0.414 0.984 1.234 1.437 
LITIGATION  5,863  0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NOA  5,863  26.810 63.079 0.455 1.114 35.812 
GDP  5,863  10.230 0.219 10.235 10.235 10.416 
ESSI  5,863  0.238 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.000 
              












Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients among the main variables involved in the analysis. *,**,*** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 EM_ALL 1
2 REM_vs_AEM 0.002 1
3 CSR -0.151*** -0.036** 1
4 ENFORCEMENT 0.262*** -0.025 -0.144*** 1
5 SIZE 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.440*** 0.013 1
6 LEV 0.147*** 0.098*** 0.028* 0.175*** 0.224*** 1
7 ADJ_ROA 0.040** -0.023 -0.077*** 0.105*** -0.027* -0.034** 1
8 GROWTH 0.012 -0.008 -0.054*** 0.034** -0.002 0.069*** 0.011 1
9 MTB -0.042** -0.116*** 0.029* 0.198*** 0.070*** -0.083*** 0.062*** 0.026* 1
10 BELOW 0.094*** -0.026* 0.009 -0.057*** -0.025 0.004 -0.040** 0.091*** -0.037** 1
11 HIGH -0.148*** 0.038** 0.269*** -0.432*** 0.444*** -0.103*** -0.057*** -0.023 -0.022 0.114*** 1
12 IFRS -0.068*** 0.023 0.303*** 0.101*** 0.151*** 0.077*** -0.007 0.029* 0.057*** -0.028* -0.096*** 1
13 MKT_CAP 0.121*** -0.015 -0.116*** 0.493*** -0.074*** 0.048*** 0.026* 0.051*** 0.158*** -0.017 -0.271*** 0.038** 1
14 LITIGATION -0.044*** -0.075*** -0.039** 0.058*** -0.035** -0.157*** 0.014 -0.032* 0.071*** -0.005 -0.01 -0.088*** 0.036** 1
15 NOA -0.131*** 0.034* 0.034** -0.489*** -0.018 -0.035** -0.064*** 0.134*** -0.119*** 0.044*** 0.258*** -0.178*** -0.200*** -0.059*** 1
16 GDP -0.032* -0.038** -0.086*** -0.311*** -0.042** -0.178*** -0.026* -0.088*** -0.072*** -0.035** 0.271*** -0.351*** -0.164*** 0.064*** -0.097*** 1 1
17 ESSI 0.003 -0.052*** 0.232*** -0.066*** 0.144*** 0.098*** -0.018 0.005 0.046*** -0.050*** 0.126*** 0.070*** -0.068*** -0.041** 0.083*** 0.002 0.002
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Table 4. CSR and Earnings Management Strategies 
 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports 2SLS estimates from model (1). *,**,*** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed and are reported in brackets. Standard errors 




Dependent Variable: CSR EM_ALL EM_ALL DA REAL DA REAL REM_vs_AEM
I stage II stage II stage OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Full Sample Non-US Full Sample Full Sample Beta Coeff Beta Coeff Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSR -1.121*** -1.214*** -0.001* -0.021*** -0.037* -0.156*** -0.075***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.079] [0.000] [0.079] [0.000] [0.000]
CSR_IV 0.454***
[0.000]
SIZE 0.817*** 1.345*** 1.120*** 0.006*** 0.055*** 0.083*** 0.205*** 0.071***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
LEV -0.822*** 0.519 0.678 -0.009 0.151*** -0.018 0.077*** 0.054
[0.006] [0.506] [0.472] [0.438] [0.003] [0.438] [0.003] [0.177]
ADJ_ROA -0.131** -0.002 -0.199 0.004* -0.004 0.025* -0.008 -0.014*
[0.013] [0.990] [0.228] [0.053] [0.636] [0.053] [0.636] [0.056]
GROWTH -0.019** -0.037** -0.032** -0.000* -0.002 -0.017* -0.030 -0.001
[0.021] [0.022] [0.021] [0.090] [0.243] [0.090] [0.243] [0.152]
MTB 0.009 -0.075*** -0.120*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.029 -0.150*** -0.003***
[0.126] [0.000] [0.000] [0.155] [0.000] [0.155] [0.000] [0.002]
BELOW 0.218 3.902*** 4.810*** 0.059*** 0.098*** 0.137*** 0.058*** -0.031
[0.217] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.121]
HIGH 0.070 -0.986*** -1.459*** -0.017*** -0.046** -0.104*** -0.072** 0.017
[0.512] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.034] [0.000] [0.034] [0.240]
IFRS 0.237 0.417 0.286 0.003 0.032 0.013 0.042 0.026
[0.111] [0.255] [0.434] [0.677] [0.216] [0.677] [0.216] [0.211]
MKT_CAP 0.707*** 0.266 0.268 -0.007 -0.005 -0.040 -0.007 0.055*
[0.006] [0.689] [0.672] [0.505] [0.890] [0.505] [0.890] [0.072]
LITIGATION 0.195* -0.589** -0.705** -0.006* -0.038* -0.032* -0.052* -0.018
[0.084] [0.036] [0.033] [0.069] [0.080] [0.069] [0.080] [0.186]
NOA -0.004*** 0.002 0.003 0.000** 0.000 0.048** 0.046 -0.000**
[0.007] [0.459] [0.366] [0.024] [0.167] [0.024] [0.167] [0.025]
GDP -4.023 1.143 -1.097 0.104 -0.162 0.301 -0.123 -0.572***
[0.112] [0.837] [0.787] [0.160] [0.513] [0.160] [0.513] [0.000]
ESSI 0.467*** 1.278*** 1.238*** 0.015*** -0.025 0.090*** -0.037 0.031
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000] [0.240] [0.000] [0.240] [0.119]
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES




Observations 5,863 5,863 3,587 5,863 5,863 5,863 5,863 5,863





Table 5. CSR, Legal Enforcement and the Trade-off amongst Earnings Management 
Strategies 
      
Dependent Variable: REM_vs_AEM 
  2SLS 
 
Coefficient P-value 
CSR -0.035** [0.019] 
ENFORCEMENT  0.568*** [0.000] 
CSR*ENFORCEMENT -0.074*** [0.000] 
SIZE  0.065*** [0.000] 
LEV  0.032 [0.480] 
ADJ_ROA -0.014* [0.080] 
GROWTH -0.002** [0.041] 
MTB -0.003*** [0.008] 
BELOW -0.054*** [0.008] 
HIGH  0.069*** [0.001] 
IFRS  0.065** [0.013] 
MKT_CAP  0.016 [0.630] 
LITIGATION -0.013 [0.411] 
NOA -0.000* [0.090] 
GDP -0.578*** [0.000] 
ESSI  0.032 [0.124] 
Constant  5.828*** [0.000] 
   Year fixed effects YES 
Country fixed effects YES 
Observations 5,863 
R-squared 0.060 
    
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports 2SLS estimates from model (2). In the un-tabulated first-
stage, we use the mean of the CSR orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm’s i 2-digit SIC code as 
instrument for CSR. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two-






Table. 6. CSR, Real Earnings Management and Future Performance 
 
	  
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports results from the Sobel Test described in Figures 1 and 2. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed and are reported 
in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q REM_vs_AEM Tobin's Q
(1) (2) (3)




SIZE -0.302*** 0.015*** -0.291***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
LEV -0.418** 0.108*** -0.345*
[0.022] [0.000] [0.056]
ADJ_ROA 0.117*** -0.005 0.115***
[0.000] [0.288] [0.000]
GROWTH 0.001 -0.000 0.001
[0.310] [0.686] [0.336]
HIGH 0.166*** 0.009 0.170***
[0.001] [0.232] [0.000]
MTB 0.051*** -0.004*** 0.049***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDP 0.815 -0.319** 0.631
[0.433] [0.013] [0.575]












Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
Sobel Test
Z-test = 4.13
P > |Z| = 0.000
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Table 7. Subsample of Firms that Met/Beat Analysts’ Consensus Forecast 
      
Dependent Variable: REM_vs_AEM 
 
Subsample 
  2SLS 
 
Coefficient P-value 
CSR -0.035** [0.034] 
ENFORCEMENT  0.543*** [0.001] 
CSR*ENFORCEMENT -0.069*** [0.001] 
SIZE  0.068*** [0.001] 
LEV  0.064 [0.158] 
ADJ_ROA -0.013 [0.149] 
GROWTH -0.013*** [0.007] 
MTB -0.002 [0.125] 
BELOW -0.052* [0.077] 
HIGH  0.067*** [0.003] 
IFRS  0.091*** [0.002] 
MKT_CAP  0.012 [0.753] 
LITIGATION -0.014 [0.377] 
NOA -0.000* [0.074] 
GDP -0.571*** [0.000] 
ESSI  0.025 [0.302] 
Constant  5.727*** [0.000] 
   Year fixed effects YES 
Country fixed effects YES 
  Observations 3,818 
R-squared 0.067 
    
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports 2SLS estimates from model (2) estimated using the 
subsample of firms that met/beat analysts’ forecasts. In the un-tabulated first-stage, we use the mean of the CSR 
orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm’s i 2-digit SIC code as instrument for CSR. *,**,*** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two-tailed and are reported in brackets. 





Table 8. CSR, Legal Enforcement and Earnings Management Strategies 
             
Dependent Variable: EM_ALL2 REM2_vs_AEM 
  II stage II stage 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
  (1) (2) 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
CSR -1.232*** [0.002] -0.038*** [0.009] 
ENFORCEMENT      0.564*** [0.000] 
CSR*ENFORCEMENT     -0.081*** [0.000] 
SIZE  1.531*** [0.000]  0.075*** [0.000] 
LEV  1.259 [0.121]  0.062 [0.172] 
ADJ_ROA -0.150 [0.321] -0.022*** [0.006] 
GROWTH -0.046** [0.015] -0.003** [0.025] 
MTB -0.073*** [0.000] -0.003** [0.012] 
BELOW  5.246*** [0.000]  0.000 [0.991] 
HIGH -1.295*** [0.000]  0.056*** [0.008] 
IFRS  0.545 [0.137]  0.067** [0.015] 
MKT_CAP  0.320 [0.692]  0.022 [0.549] 
LITIGATION -0.607** [0.035] -0.012 [0.417] 
NOA  0.002 [0.542] -0.000** [0.050] 
GDP  0.782 [0.912] -0.659** [0.040] 
ESSI  1.463*** [0.000]  0.042* [0.052] 
Constant -2.693 [0.970]  6.603** [0.043] 
          
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES 
          
Observations 5,863 5,863 
          
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports 2SLS estimates from model (1) (column 1) and model (2) 
(column 2) estimated using an alternative proxy of real earnings management. In the un-tabulated first-stage, we use 
the mean of the CSR orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm’s i 2-digit SIC code as instrument for CSR. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two-tailed and are reported 













































Sobel Test  
Z-test =  4.13 
P>|Z|= 0.000 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3.
CSR  Tobin’s Q  
0.033*** 
Link C 
CSR  Tobin’s Q  
-0.008*** 




         Link  B REM_vs_AEM 
Link B 
Performance at 
(t+n) CSR orientation 
Link C 












We used CSR scores for three dimensions of CSR performance available in the EIRIS dataset: 1) Employee 
performance, 2) Environmental performance, and 3) Community performance. 
 
As regards Employee performance, the EIRIS dataset contains a textual judgment on the following sub-
dimensions: 
a) Health and safety systems  
b) Training and development systems  
c) Systems for maintaining good employee relations  
d) Systems/practices for job creation and security  
e) Equal opportunities policy  
f) Equal opportunities systems and practice 
 
Each sub-dimension contains one of the following three textual judgments: 
Ø Little or no evidence 
Ø Some evidence 
Ø Clear evidence 
 
We first converted the textual judgment in a numeric score ranging from 1 to 3, and secondly we summed all 
the scores to obtain a single score for the dimension “employee performance” which therefore ranges from 6 to 
18. 
 
We did the same for the Environmental performance dimension. The EIRIS dataset contains a textual 
judgment on the following sub-dimensions: 
a) Environmental impact improvements 
b) Environmental management system 
c) Environmental policy and commitment 
d) Environmental reporting 
 







We converted the textual judgment in a numeric score ranging from 1 to 5 and we summed all the scores to 
obtain a single score for the dimension “Environmental performance” which therefore ranges from 4 to 20. 
Finally, for the Community performance dimension, the EIRIS dataset only contains one sub-dimension and 
we converted the textual score in a numeric score ranging from 1 to 4. 
 
At this point we had a unique score of the three CSR dimensions (Employee, Environment, and Community) 
with a maximum score of 18, 20, and 4, respectively. In order to ensure that each dimension has the same 
weight, we further normalize the Employee and Environmental score to a scale out of 4. Finally, we computed 
the overall CSR metric by summing the three normalized scores. Since each standardized metric ranges from 
one to four, the overall metric ranges from three to twelve. 
 






Employee performance’s scores in EIRIS: 
 
• Health and safety systems: LITTLE 
• Training and development systems: LITTLE 
• Systems for maintaining good employee relations: MEDIUM 
• Systems/practices for job creation and security: LITTLE 
• Equal opportunities policy: LITTLE 
• Equal opportunities systems and practice: LITTLE 
 
Score Employee performance: (1+1+2+1+1+1) = 7 
Normalized Score for Employee performance = 7 / (Max Employee Score / 4) = 7 / (18/4) = 1.56 
 
Environmental performance’s scores in EIRIS: 
 
• Environmental impact improvements: WEAK 
• Environmental management system: WEAK 
• Environmental policy and commitment: GOOD 
 
Score Environmental performance: (2+2+4) = 8 
Normalized Score for Environmental performance = 8 / (Max Environ. score / 4) = 8 / (20/4) = 1.60 
 
Community performance’s scores in EIRIS: 
 
• Commitment to community or charitable work: LITTLE 
 
Score Community performance: 1 
 
Normalized Score Employee performance = 1.56 
Normalized Score Environmental performance = 1.60 
Normalized Score Community performance = 1  
Normalized Score Overall CSR = (1.56+1.60+1) = 4.16 
 







Accrual-based earnings management 
We use the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones, 1991), as described in Dechow et al. (1995) to 
estimate for each two-digit SIC-year-country grouping as follows: 𝑇𝐴!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! ∆𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑃𝑃𝐸!"𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (1) 
where TA is equal to total accruals in year t measured as net income before extraordinary items less operating 
cash flow; A is the firm’s total assets; ΔS is the change in sales and PPE is equal to property plan and 
equipment gross. 
The coefficient estimates from equation (1) are used to estimate firm-specific normal accruals (NA): 𝑁𝐴!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! ∆𝑆!" − ∆𝐴𝑅!"𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑃𝑃𝐸!"𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (2) 
where ΔAR is the change in accounting receivables. Our measure of discretionary accruals (AEM) is the 
difference between total accruals and the fitted normal accruals, defined as  𝐴𝐸𝑀!" = 𝑇𝐴!"𝐴!"!! − 𝑁𝐴!"𝐴!"!! 3  
 
Real earnings management 
As in Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), we use the abnormal levels of cash flow from 
operation (R_CFO), the abnormal level of production costs (R_PROD), and the abnormal level of 
discretionary expenses (R_DEXP) to capture the extent of real earnings management activity. Following the 
model developed by Dechow et al. (1998), as implemented in Roychowdhury (2006), we express normal cash 
flow from operations as a linear function of sales and changes in sales in the current period. Through this 
equation we identify price discounts or more lenient credit terms that permit firms to inflate current year sales 
by accelerating sales from the next year. Firms that accelerate sales are likely to have lower operating cash 
flow for given sales. In order to estimate the model, we run the following cross-sectional regression model for 
each country, industry, and year: 𝐶𝐹𝑂!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! ∆𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (4) 
where CFO is operating cash flow and it is expressed as a linear function of sales (S) and the change in sales 
(ΔS). For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations (R_CFO) is the actual CFO minus the normal 
level of CFO calculated using the estimated coefficient from equation (4).  
Overproduction is another way companies might use to record higher earnings in the current year since fixed 
production costs remain lodged in inventory. The incremental marginal costs incurred in producing additional 
inventories result in abnormally high production costs given sales (Athanasakou et al. JBFA 2011). Production 
costs are defined as the sum of costs of goods sold (COGS) and the change in inventory during the year 
(ΔINV): 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷!" = 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆!" + Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉!" 5  
We estimate normal production costs (COGS) by using Roychowdhury’s (2006) model as follows: 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (6) 
and similarly, the model for normal inventory growth is estimated as: ΔINV!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! Δ𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! Δ𝑆!"!!𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (7) 
For every firm-year, abnormal production costs (R_PROD) is the actual production costs (Cost of goods sold 
plus the change in inventories) minus the normal level of production costs as in equation (5) calculated using 
the estimated coefficient from equations (6) and (7). 
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A third way to operate in order to achieve better results is through managing discretionary expenses as 
research and development costs (R&D), selling, general, and administrative costs cutting (SG&A), and 
advertising costs (ADV). 𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑃!" = 𝑅&𝐷!" + SG&𝐴!" + ADV!" 8  
The normal level of research and development costs (R&D), selling, general, and administrative costs cutting 
(SG&A), and advertising costs (ADV) is modeled as in models (9) – (11) respectively: R&𝐷!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"!!𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (9) SG&𝐴!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"!!𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (10) ADV!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"!!𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (11) 
For every firm-year, abnormal discretionary costs (R_DEXP) is the actual discretionary costs (research and 
development costs plus selling, general and administrative costs cutting plus advertising costs) minus normal 
level of discretionary costs as in equation (8) calculated using the estimated coefficient from equations (9), 






DA  Discretionary accruals measured using the Modified Jones Model (Jones, 1991). See Appendix 2. 
REAL  Sum of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses (multiplied by minus 1), computed as in Roychowdhury (2006). See Appendix 2. 
REAL2 Sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses (both of them multiplied by minus 1), computed as in Roychowdhury (2006). See Appendix 2. 
EM_ALL Decile (DA) + Decile (REAL) 
REM_vs_AEM Decile (REAL) /[Decile (DA) + Decile (REAL)] 
EM_ALL2 Decile (DA) + Decile (REAL2) 
REM2_vs_AEM Decile (REAL2) /[Decile (DA) + Decile (REAL2)] 
CSR  EIRIS’s CSR score. See Appendix 1. 
CSR_IV Mean of the CSR orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm’s i 2-digit SIC code, excluding firm i. 
ENFORCEMENT  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 (0) for countries with a strong (weak) legal enforcement according to the “Rule of Law.” 
SIZE  Logarithm of the firm's total sales. 
LEV  End-of-year total liabilities divided by the end-of-year book value of equity. 
ADJ_ROA  
Difference between the firm’s profitability (ROA computed as operating income over the 
mean value of total assets between year t and year t-1) and the industry median for a given 
year. 
GROWTH  Percentage change in sales. 
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
BELOW  Dummy equal to 1 when the pre-managed earnings (measured by the operating cash flow) are less than zero, 0 otherwise. 
HIGH  Dummy equal to 1 when the firm is outperforming (operating cash flow above the sample 75th percentile), 0 otherwise. 
IFRS  Dummy equal to 1 if the firm adopts IFRS and 0 if reports are prepared using domestic GAAP. 
MKT_CAP  Logarithm of stock market capitalization. 
LITIGATION  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a high-risk industry, 0 otherwise. 
NOA  Lagged net operating assets scaled by lagged sales. 
GDP  Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. 
ESSI  Dummy equal to 1 for socially and environmentally sensitive industries, 0 otherwise. 







Panel B. Breakdown by country 
Country         DA REAL CSR ENFORCEMENT* 
      AUSTRALIA Mean 0.028 -0.081 6.819 1.755 
 
Median 0.017 -0.055 6.455 1.748 
BELGIUM Mean -0.012 -0.074 8.046 1.296 
 
Median -0.008 -0.021 8.290 1.309 
CHINA & HONG KONG Mean -0.005 -0.002 5.329 1.358 
 
Median -0.009 -0.001 5.130 1.549 
DENMARK Mean -0.020 -0.062 7.798 1.942 
 
Median -0.017 0.018 8.090 1.950 
FINLAND Mean 0.025 0.058 9.406 1.943 
 
Median 0.050 0.175 9.510 1.957 
FRANCE Mean 0.011 -0.029 8.020 1.424 
 
Median 0.006 -0.021 8.490 1.436 
GERMANY Mean 0.005 -0.080 7.930 1.665 
 
Median 0.002 -0.037 8.470 1.654 
GREECE Mean -0.046 -0.080 8.630 0.810 
 
Median -0.056 -0.069 7.400 0.789 
IRELAND Mean 0.013 -0.124 3.580 1.746 
 
Median -0.013 -0.113 3.580 1.741 
ISRAEL Mean -0.028 -0.020 4.658 0.837 
 
Median 0.003 0.053 3.800 0.809 
ITALY Mean 0.008 0.000 8.021 0.402 
 
Median 0.005 -0.002 8.490 0.354 
JAPAN Mean -0.004 -0.059 6.980 1.289 
 
Median -0.003 -0.015 7.510 1.290 
KOREA, SOUTH Mean -0.026 -0.085 7.398 0.961 
 
Median -0.031 -0.039 7.220 0.979 
NETHERLANDS Mean 0.002 -0.027 9.066 1.764 
 
Median 0.002 -0.020 9.290 1.763 
NEW ZEALAND Mean -0.021 0.008 7.028 1.897 
 
Median -0.022 0.017 7.645 1.897 
NORWAY Mean 0.035 0.075 7.724 1.945 
 
Median 0.001 0.011 8.270 1.943 
SINGAPORE Mean -0.018 0.031 5.046 1.682 
 
Median -0.025 0.051 5.330 1.675 
SPAIN Mean -0.004 -0.031 8.343 1.109 
 
Median 0.005 -0.011 8.580 1.099 
SWEDEN Mean -0.002 0.097 6.963 1.881 
 
Median 0.001 0.066 7.270 1.894 
SWITZERLAND Mean -0.004 -0.103 6.857 1.842 
 
Median 0.001 -0.124 6.820 1.849 
THAILAND Mean -0.002 0.014 5.130 -0.136 
 
Median -0.003 0.101 5.130 -0.109 
UNITED KINGDOM Mean -0.004 0.047 8.488 1.664 
 
Median 0.000 0.010 8.440 1.668 
UNITED STATES Mean 0.030 0.082 5.899 1.559 
 
Median 0.033 0.077 5.780 1.540 
* Continuous variable measured as the Kaufmann's Rule of Law     




Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients among the main variables involved in the analysis. *,**,*** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 EM_ALL 1
2 REM_vs_AEM 0.002 1
3 CSR -0.151*** -0.036** 1
4 ENFORCEMENT 0.262*** -0.025 -0.144*** 1
5 SIZE 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.440*** 0.013 1
6 LEV 0.147*** 0.098*** 0.028* 0.175*** 0.224*** 1
7 ADJ_ROA 0.040** -0.023 -0.077*** 0.105*** -0.027* -0.034** 1
8 GROWTH 0.012 -0.008 -0.054*** 0.034** -0.002 0.069*** 0.011 1
9 MTB -0.042** -0.116*** 0.029* 0.198*** 0.070*** -0.083*** 0.062*** 0.026* 1
10 BELOW 0.094*** -0.026* 0.009 -0.057*** -0.025 0.004 -0.040** 0.091*** -0.037** 1
11 HIGH -0.148*** 0.038** 0.269*** -0.432*** 0.444*** -0.103*** -0.057*** -0.023 -0.022 0.114*** 1
12 IFRS -0.068*** 0.023 0.303*** 0.101*** 0.151*** 0.077*** -0.007 0.029* 0.057*** -0.028* -0.096*** 1
13 MKT_CAP 0.121*** -0.015 -0.116*** 0.493*** -0.074*** 0.048*** 0.026* 0.051*** 0.158*** -0.017 -0.271*** 0.038** 1
14 LITIGATION -0.044*** -0.075*** -0.039** 0.058*** -0.035** -0.157*** 0.014 -0.032* 0.071*** -0.005 -0.01 -0.088*** 0.036** 1
15 NOA -0.131*** 0.034* 0.034** -0.489*** -0.018 -0.035** -0.064*** 0.134*** -0.119*** 0.044*** 0.258*** -0.178*** -0.200*** -0.059*** 1
16 GDP -0.032* -0.038** -0.086*** -0.311*** -0.042** -0.178*** -0.026* -0.088*** -0.072*** -0.035** 0.271*** -0.351*** -0.164*** 0.064*** -0.097*** 1 1
17 ESSI 0.003 -0.052*** 0.232*** -0.066*** 0.144*** 0.098*** -0.018 0.005 0.046*** -0.050*** 0.126*** 0.070*** -0.068*** -0.041** 0.083*** 0.002 0.002
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Table 4. CSR and Earnings Management Strategies 
 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports 2SLS estimates from model (1). *,**,*** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed and are reported in brackets. Standard errors 




Dependent Variable: CSR EM_ALL EM_ALL DA REAL DA REAL REM_vs_AEM
I stage II stage II stage OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Full Sample Non-US Full Sample Full Sample Beta Coeff Beta Coeff Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSR -1.121*** -1.214*** -0.001* -0.021*** -0.037* -0.156*** -0.075***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.079] [0.000] [0.079] [0.000] [0.000]
CSR_IV 0.454***
[0.000]
SIZE 0.817*** 1.345*** 1.120*** 0.006*** 0.055*** 0.083*** 0.205*** 0.071***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
LEV -0.822*** 0.519 0.678 -0.009 0.151*** -0.018 0.077*** 0.054
[0.006] [0.506] [0.472] [0.438] [0.003] [0.438] [0.003] [0.177]
ADJ_ROA -0.131** -0.002 -0.199 0.004* -0.004 0.025* -0.008 -0.014*
[0.013] [0.990] [0.228] [0.053] [0.636] [0.053] [0.636] [0.056]
GROWTH -0.019** -0.037** -0.032** -0.000* -0.002 -0.017* -0.030 -0.001
[0.021] [0.022] [0.021] [0.090] [0.243] [0.090] [0.243] [0.152]
MTB 0.009 -0.075*** -0.120*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.029 -0.150*** -0.003***
[0.126] [0.000] [0.000] [0.155] [0.000] [0.155] [0.000] [0.002]
BELOW 0.218 3.902*** 4.810*** 0.059*** 0.098*** 0.137*** 0.058*** -0.031
[0.217] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.121]
HIGH 0.070 -0.986*** -1.459*** -0.017*** -0.046** -0.104*** -0.072** 0.017
[0.512] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.034] [0.000] [0.034] [0.240]
IFRS 0.237 0.417 0.286 0.003 0.032 0.013 0.042 0.026
[0.111] [0.255] [0.434] [0.677] [0.216] [0.677] [0.216] [0.211]
MKT_CAP 0.707*** 0.266 0.268 -0.007 -0.005 -0.040 -0.007 0.055*
[0.006] [0.689] [0.672] [0.505] [0.890] [0.505] [0.890] [0.072]
LITIGATION 0.195* -0.589** -0.705** -0.006* -0.038* -0.032* -0.052* -0.018
[0.084] [0.036] [0.033] [0.069] [0.080] [0.069] [0.080] [0.186]
NOA -0.004*** 0.002 0.003 0.000** 0.000 0.048** 0.046 -0.000**
[0.007] [0.459] [0.366] [0.024] [0.167] [0.024] [0.167] [0.025]
GDP -4.023 1.143 -1.097 0.104 -0.162 0.301 -0.123 -0.572***
[0.112] [0.837] [0.787] [0.160] [0.513] [0.160] [0.513] [0.000]
ESSI 0.467*** 1.278*** 1.238*** 0.015*** -0.025 0.090*** -0.037 0.031
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000] [0.240] [0.000] [0.240] [0.119]
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES




Observations 5,863 5,863 3,587 5,863 5,863 5,863 5,863 5,863





Table 5. CSR, Legal Enforcement and the Trade-off amongst Earnings Management 
Strategies 
      
Dependent Variable: REM_vs_AEM 
  2SLS 
 
Coefficient P-value 
CSR -0.035** [0.019] 
ENFORCEMENT  0.568*** [0.000] 
CSR*ENFORCEMENT -0.074*** [0.000] 
SIZE  0.065*** [0.000] 
LEV  0.032 [0.480] 
ADJ_ROA -0.014* [0.080] 
GROWTH -0.002** [0.041] 
MTB -0.003*** [0.008] 
BELOW -0.054*** [0.008] 
HIGH  0.069*** [0.001] 
IFRS  0.065** [0.013] 
MKT_CAP  0.016 [0.630] 
LITIGATION -0.013 [0.411] 
NOA -0.000* [0.090] 
GDP -0.578*** [0.000] 
ESSI  0.032 [0.124] 
Constant  5.828*** [0.000] 
   Year fixed effects YES 
Country fixed effects YES 
Observations 5,863 
R-squared 0.060 
    
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports 2SLS estimates from model (2). In the un-tabulated first-
stage, we use the mean of the CSR orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm’s i 2-digit SIC code as 
instrument for CSR. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two-






Table. 6. CSR, Real Earnings Management and Future Performance 
 
	  
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports results from the Sobel Test described in Figures 1 and 2. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed and are reported 
in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q REM_vs_AEM Tobin's Q
(1) (2) (3)




SIZE -0.302*** 0.015*** -0.291***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
LEV -0.418** 0.108*** -0.345*
[0.022] [0.000] [0.056]
ADJ_ROA 0.117*** -0.005 0.115***
[0.000] [0.288] [0.000]
GROWTH 0.001 -0.000 0.001
[0.310] [0.686] [0.336]
HIGH 0.166*** 0.009 0.170***
[0.001] [0.232] [0.000]
MTB 0.051*** -0.004*** 0.049***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDP 0.815 -0.319** 0.631
[0.433] [0.013] [0.575]












Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
Sobel Test
Z-test = 4.13
P > |Z| = 0.000
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Table 7. Subsample of Firms that Met/Beat Analysts’ Consensus Forecast 
      
Dependent Variable: REM_vs_AEM 
 
Subsample 
  2SLS 
 
Coefficient P-value 
CSR -0.035** [0.034] 
ENFORCEMENT  0.543*** [0.001] 
CSR*ENFORCEMENT -0.069*** [0.001] 
SIZE  0.068*** [0.001] 
LEV  0.064 [0.158] 
ADJ_ROA -0.013 [0.149] 
GROWTH -0.013*** [0.007] 
MTB -0.002 [0.125] 
BELOW -0.052* [0.077] 
HIGH  0.067*** [0.003] 
IFRS  0.091*** [0.002] 
MKT_CAP  0.012 [0.753] 
LITIGATION -0.014 [0.377] 
NOA -0.000* [0.074] 
GDP -0.571*** [0.000] 
ESSI  0.025 [0.302] 
Constant  5.727*** [0.000] 
   Year fixed effects YES 
Country fixed effects YES 
  Observations 3,818 
R-squared 0.067 
    
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports 2SLS estimates from model (2) estimated using the 
subsample of firms that met/beat analysts’ forecasts. In the un-tabulated first-stage, we use the mean of the CSR 
orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm’s i 2-digit SIC code as instrument for CSR. *,**,*** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two-tailed and are reported in brackets. 





Table 8. CSR, Legal Enforcement and Earnings Management Strategies 
             
Dependent Variable: EM_ALL2 REM2_vs_AEM 
  II stage II stage 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
  (1) (2) 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
CSR -1.232*** [0.002] -0.038*** [0.009] 
ENFORCEMENT      0.564*** [0.000] 
CSR*ENFORCEMENT     -0.081*** [0.000] 
SIZE  1.531*** [0.000]  0.075*** [0.000] 
LEV  1.259 [0.121]  0.062 [0.172] 
ADJ_ROA -0.150 [0.321] -0.022*** [0.006] 
GROWTH -0.046** [0.015] -0.003** [0.025] 
MTB -0.073*** [0.000] -0.003** [0.012] 
BELOW  5.246*** [0.000]  0.000 [0.991] 
HIGH -1.295*** [0.000]  0.056*** [0.008] 
IFRS  0.545 [0.137]  0.067** [0.015] 
MKT_CAP  0.320 [0.692]  0.022 [0.549] 
LITIGATION -0.607** [0.035] -0.012 [0.417] 
NOA  0.002 [0.542] -0.000** [0.050] 
GDP  0.782 [0.912] -0.659** [0.040] 
ESSI  1.463*** [0.000]  0.042* [0.052] 
Constant -2.693 [0.970]  6.603** [0.043] 
          
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES 
          
Observations 5,863 5,863 
          
Variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports 2SLS estimates from model (1) (column 1) and model (2) 
(column 2) estimated using an alternative proxy of real earnings management. In the un-tabulated first-stage, we use 
the mean of the CSR orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm’s i 2-digit SIC code as instrument for CSR. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two-tailed and are reported 













































Sobel Test  
Z-test =  4.13 
P>|Z|= 0.000 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix 3.
CSR  Tobin’s Q  
0.033*** 
Link C 
CSR  Tobin’s Q  
-0.008*** 




         Link  B REM_vs_AEM 
Link B 
Performance at 
(t+n) CSR orientation 
Link C 












We used CSR scores for three dimensions of CSR performance available in the EIRIS dataset: 1) Employee 
performance, 2) Environmental performance, and 3) Community performance. 
 
As regards Employee performance, the EIRIS dataset contains a textual judgment on the following sub-
dimensions: 
a) Health and safety systems  
b) Training and development systems  
c) Systems for maintaining good employee relations  
d) Systems/practices for job creation and security  
e) Equal opportunities policy  
f) Equal opportunities systems and practice 
 
Each sub-dimension contains one of the following three textual judgments: 
Ø Little or no evidence 
Ø Some evidence 
Ø Clear evidence 
 
We first converted the textual judgment in a numeric score ranging from 1 to 3, and secondly we summed all 
the scores to obtain a single score for the dimension “employee performance” which therefore ranges from 6 to 
18. 
 
We did the same for the Environmental performance dimension. The EIRIS dataset contains a textual 
judgment on the following sub-dimensions: 
a) Environmental impact improvements 
b) Environmental management system 
c) Environmental policy and commitment 
d) Environmental reporting 
 







We converted the textual judgment in a numeric score ranging from 1 to 5 and we summed all the scores to 
obtain a single score for the dimension “Environmental performance” which therefore ranges from 4 to 20. 
Finally, for the Community performance dimension, the EIRIS dataset only contains one sub-dimension and 
we converted the textual score in a numeric score ranging from 1 to 4. 
 
At this point we had a unique score of the three CSR dimensions (Employee, Environment, and Community) 
with a maximum score of 18, 20, and 4, respectively. In order to ensure that each dimension has the same 
weight, we further normalize the Employee and Environmental score to a scale out of 4. Finally, we computed 
the overall CSR metric by summing the three normalized scores. Since each standardized metric ranges from 
one to four, the overall metric ranges from three to twelve. 
 






Employee performance’s scores in EIRIS: 
 
• Health and safety systems: LITTLE 
• Training and development systems: LITTLE 
• Systems for maintaining good employee relations: MEDIUM 
• Systems/practices for job creation and security: LITTLE 
• Equal opportunities policy: LITTLE 
• Equal opportunities systems and practice: LITTLE 
 
Score Employee performance: (1+1+2+1+1+1) = 7 
Normalized Score for Employee performance = 7 / (Max Employee Score / 4) = 7 / (18/4) = 1.56 
 
Environmental performance’s scores in EIRIS: 
 
• Environmental impact improvements: WEAK 
• Environmental management system: WEAK 
• Environmental policy and commitment: GOOD 
 
Score Environmental performance: (2+2+4) = 8 
Normalized Score for Environmental performance = 8 / (Max Environ. score / 4) = 8 / (20/4) = 1.60 
 
Community performance’s scores in EIRIS: 
 
• Commitment to community or charitable work: LITTLE 
 
Score Community performance: 1 
 
Normalized Score Employee performance = 1.56 
Normalized Score Environmental performance = 1.60 
Normalized Score Community performance = 1  
Normalized Score Overall CSR = (1.56+1.60+1) = 4.16 
 







Accrual-based earnings management 
We use the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones, 1991), as described in Dechow et al. (1995) to 
estimate for each two-digit SIC-year-country grouping as follows: 𝑇𝐴!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! ∆𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑃𝑃𝐸!"𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (1) 
where TA is equal to total accruals in year t measured as net income before extraordinary items less operating 
cash flow; A is the firm’s total assets; ΔS is the change in sales and PPE is equal to property plan and 
equipment gross. 
The coefficient estimates from equation (1) are used to estimate firm-specific normal accruals (NA): 𝑁𝐴!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! ∆𝑆!" − ∆𝐴𝑅!"𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑃𝑃𝐸!"𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (2) 
where ΔAR is the change in accounting receivables. Our measure of discretionary accruals (AEM) is the 
difference between total accruals and the fitted normal accruals, defined as  𝐴𝐸𝑀!" = 𝑇𝐴!"𝐴!"!! − 𝑁𝐴!"𝐴!"!! 3  
 
Real earnings management 
As in Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), we use the abnormal levels of cash flow from 
operation (R_CFO), the abnormal level of production costs (R_PROD), and the abnormal level of 
discretionary expenses (R_DEXP) to capture the extent of real earnings management activity. Following the 
model developed by Dechow et al. (1998), as implemented in Roychowdhury (2006), we express normal cash 
flow from operations as a linear function of sales and changes in sales in the current period. Through this 
equation we identify price discounts or more lenient credit terms that permit firms to inflate current year sales 
by accelerating sales from the next year. Firms that accelerate sales are likely to have lower operating cash 
flow for given sales. In order to estimate the model, we run the following cross-sectional regression model for 
each country, industry, and year: 𝐶𝐹𝑂!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! ∆𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (4) 
where CFO is operating cash flow and it is expressed as a linear function of sales (S) and the change in sales 
(ΔS). For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations (R_CFO) is the actual CFO minus the normal 
level of CFO calculated using the estimated coefficient from equation (4).  
Overproduction is another way companies might use to record higher earnings in the current year since fixed 
production costs remain lodged in inventory. The incremental marginal costs incurred in producing additional 
inventories result in abnormally high production costs given sales (Athanasakou et al. JBFA 2011). Production 
costs are defined as the sum of costs of goods sold (COGS) and the change in inventory during the year 
(ΔINV): 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷!" = 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆!" + Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉!" 5  
We estimate normal production costs (COGS) by using Roychowdhury’s (2006) model as follows: 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (6) 
and similarly, the model for normal inventory growth is estimated as: ΔINV!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! Δ𝑆!"𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! Δ𝑆!"!!𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (7) 
For every firm-year, abnormal production costs (R_PROD) is the actual production costs (Cost of goods sold 
plus the change in inventories) minus the normal level of production costs as in equation (5) calculated using 
the estimated coefficient from equations (6) and (7). 
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A third way to operate in order to achieve better results is through managing discretionary expenses as 
research and development costs (R&D), selling, general, and administrative costs cutting (SG&A), and 
advertising costs (ADV). 𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑃!" = 𝑅&𝐷!" + SG&𝐴!" + ADV!" 8  
The normal level of research and development costs (R&D), selling, general, and administrative costs cutting 
(SG&A), and advertising costs (ADV) is modeled as in models (9) – (11) respectively: R&𝐷!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"!!𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (9) SG&𝐴!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"!!𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (10) ADV!"𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 1𝐴!"!! + 𝛼! 𝑆!"!!𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"                                (11) 
For every firm-year, abnormal discretionary costs (R_DEXP) is the actual discretionary costs (research and 
development costs plus selling, general and administrative costs cutting plus advertising costs) minus normal 
level of discretionary costs as in equation (8) calculated using the estimated coefficient from equations (9), 






DA  Discretionary accruals measured using the Modified Jones Model (Jones, 1991). See Appendix 2. 
REAL  Sum of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses (multiplied by minus 1), computed as in Roychowdhury (2006). See Appendix 2. 
REAL2 Sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses (both of them multiplied by minus 1), computed as in Roychowdhury (2006). See Appendix 2. 
EM_ALL Decile (DA) + Decile (REAL) 
REM_vs_AEM Decile (REAL) /[Decile (DA) + Decile (REAL)] 
EM_ALL2 Decile (DA) + Decile (REAL2) 
REM2_vs_AEM Decile (REAL2) /[Decile (DA) + Decile (REAL2)] 
CSR  EIRIS’s CSR score. See Appendix 1. 
CSR_IV Mean of the CSR orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm’s i 2-digit SIC code, excluding firm i. 
ENFORCEMENT  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 (0) for countries with a strong (weak) legal enforcement according to the “Rule of Law.” 
SIZE  Logarithm of the firm's total sales. 
LEV  End-of-year total liabilities divided by the end-of-year book value of equity. 
ADJ_ROA  
Difference between the firm’s profitability (ROA computed as operating income over the 
mean value of total assets between year t and year t-1) and the industry median for a given 
year. 
GROWTH  Percentage change in sales. 
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
BELOW  Dummy equal to 1 when the pre-managed earnings (measured by the operating cash flow) are less than zero, 0 otherwise. 
HIGH  Dummy equal to 1 when the firm is outperforming (operating cash flow above the sample 75th percentile), 0 otherwise. 
IFRS  Dummy equal to 1 if the firm adopts IFRS and 0 if reports are prepared using domestic GAAP. 
MKT_CAP  Logarithm of stock market capitalization. 
LITIGATION  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a high-risk industry, 0 otherwise. 
NOA  Lagged net operating assets scaled by lagged sales. 
GDP  Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. 
ESSI  Dummy equal to 1 for socially and environmentally sensitive industries, 0 otherwise. 
Tobin's Q Firm's Tobin’s Q computed one year ahead as (total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) scaled by total assets. 
 
 
 
 	  
